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Abstract
We present a novel model for the effect of echo chambers, filter bubbles, and re-
inforcement on election results. Our model extends the well known voter model with
zealots to include reinforcement. We analyze the behaviour of the model, determine
the invariant measure, and show that reinforcement may 1) shift the distribution of
votes compared to the voter model, and 2) lead to phase transitions. We test whether
the model with reinforcement fit better than under its absence in election data from US
presidential elections, the Brexit referendum, and parliamentary elections in France,
The Netherlands, and Germany. We find in many cases that populist parties and can-
didates can be clearly identified by a high level of reinforcement. Furthermore, we
find the phase transition predicted by the model back in data. We finally discuss the
implications and relevance of our findings and possible origins of the reinforcement
behaviour in modern societies.
1 Introduction
We are living in the age of rising populism. Such statement have become abundant in
recent years [29], while there is no unique, commonly accepted definition of the term
“populism”, in the political and sociological literature. Different authors use a wide variety
of concepts to narrow down the term “populism” [16] making use of economic, social,
and political aspects, as well as organization, communication, or the personality of the
centrally involved figures. Among others, Mudde [34] and Mudde and Kaltwasser [35]
developed the idea of populism as a “thin-centered ideology”. In that fruitful interpretation,
populism expresses a structural and organizational framework that can be associated with
any ideology rather than being an ideology in itself. One central aspect proposed by Mudde
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[34] is the segregating habit of populist movements, dividing the citizens into two opposing
groups, a (corrupt, evil) elite and the (ordinary, plain and good) people. If a nationalistic
ideology is involved, the term “people” also incorporates the notion of national community
in contrast to immigrants (even when it is historically and sociologically unjustifiable).
Populists divide the population in a Manichean outlook into an in- and an out-group,
where the in-group is good and accepted, while the out-group is bad and must either be
converted or fought.
This segregating mindset of populists affects communication structures, that is the
conception, release and acceptance of news and fake-news. Members of a populist group
tend in a higher degree than the average population to accept uncritically the opinion
of their own group and to refuse other opinions [1]. The opinion, or even fake-news, is
not literally accepted but may rather be a sign of group membership. This aspect of the
populist communication structure might not be predominant in all cases, but seems to be a
logical consequence of the populists’ world understanding. Populist parties therefore share
a common rhetoric (see the investigation by the Populism Research Team, [18]) which
fuels reinforcement, filter bubbles, and echo chambers. According to this hypothesis, the
communication by populist parties reinforce the belief of their partisans (or voters) and in
the same time the partisans isolate themselves in a filter bubble in which only certain types
of information can penetrate. A group of populist partisans would thus constitute an echo
chamber in which certain points of view, while being dismissed as low value or fake in the
general population, become amplified and accepted as such. We focus in the present study
on that aspect of reinforcement, filter bubble and echo chamber. Our aim is here to develop
a variant of the well known mathematical voter model to include reinforcement, and then
to perform statistical analysis of election results to reveal traces of reinforcement. In recent
years, statistics and modeling approaches investigating the appearance and effects of filter
bubbles have been developed [15, 2, 12]. However, this study represents to our knowledge
the first attempt to reveal the signatures of reinforcement directly in election data.
Statistical patterns in election data are observed and investigated since several years [7,
41]. This novel investigation into election results is built on the principles that mathemat-
ical models can predict expected statistical patterns which can be tracked down in the
data. By deriving models with different hypotheses, it is possible to study the underlying
mechanisms generating the observed patterns and election results. Mathematical models
have a long tradition in political sciences. Two general classes of mechanisms, neutral and
non-neutral, can be studied. Non-neutral approaches take the political direction of parties
into account. The most prominent representative in this line of research is the Hotelling
model [20], that uses game theory to understand how parties position themselves in the
political arena. That model is refined, e.g. into the valence model, which is able to describe
the political landscape of many western democracies [47, 45, 46]. A line of thinking that
gained importance recently is based on neutral models [8]. The idea is that many of the
observed statistical features of election results can be explained by models that do not take
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into account the political direction of parties. In these models parties are assumed to stand
for groups of individuals who are committed to a common attitude. These models are par-
ticularly used to instigate the turnout problem formulated for the first time by Downs [9]:
Why should a single voter take the effort and go to vote, if most likely the outcome of the
election will not change? A combination of game theory and stochastic models [40, 36],
but also agent based simulation models [24] have been developed to address this problem.
More fundamentally, the noisy voter model [10, 43] addresses communication of voters to
understand the outcome of elections. In the context of elections, the noisy voter model is
called the zealot model. Zealots or partisans are individuals (or other influencing entities
as newspapers) that do not change their political direction but stick to one given group,
and influence other population members. It is successfully used to explain the variance
structure in election data [4, 27], the fraction of swing voters who readily change their
favorite party [44], or to obtain an idea about the time to consensus [33]. The voter model
with party dynamics is an alternative approach, where the fixed number of parties in the
zealot model is replaced by a dynamical mechanism, in which parties can be crated and
vanish again [19]. This latter approach explains the log-linear structure in election data
observed in several countries as soon as more than 10 candidates (or parties) are present
[19]. A noisy-voter model with linear branching process can also generate distributions of
candidates’ vote shares when the candidates are in the same party [13]. Note, however,
that mathematically these models do not allow for bifurcations and phase transitions –
similar to disruption, phase transitions lead to sudden fundamental changes in the system
though the situation seemed to be only slightly changed. Few models exhibiting phase
transitions are nevertheless used in mathematical sociology [14, 32]. Of special relevance,
Nicolao and Ostilli used a Potts model to investigate twitter data related to elections [39].
The Potts model shows a phase transition for certain parameter combinations. Interest-
ingly, the authors identify in the data parameters that often are close to those critical
parameter values. In some cases, the data indicated that the twitter system spontaneously
breaks the symmetry and can generate different outcome/behavior, which is to expect for
a supercritical system [39].
In the present paper, we augment the zealot model by integrating reinforcement. We
thus want to investigate if such neutral model with reinforcement captures observed pat-
terns in election data, and thus if reinforcement, filter bubbles, and echo chambers are im-
portant enough for populist parties or candidates to leave statistical signatures in election
data. First, we develop the model and investigate its mathematical behavior. By investi-
gating a strong- and a weak-effects limit for large population sizes, we find bifurcations and
phase transitions. In the limit of weak effects, we derive explicitly the invariant measure for
the vote share for our reinforcement model. Second, we analyze election data from several
elections (US presidential, Brexit in the UK, parliamentary in Germany, Netherlands and
France) and show that often the reinforcement model describes the data appropriately,
and significantly better than the zealot model. We conclude that reinforcement and echo
3
chambers represent forces that leave signatures in the empirical data. Astonishingly, it
is often (but not always) possible to clearly identify populist parties and candidates as
they show a high reinforcement parameter (US, Germany, Brexit, but not France). Fur-
thermore, the traces of phase transitions are visible in election data (The Netherlands).
Finally, we discuss the implications and relevance of our results and limitations of our
modeling/statistical approach.
2 Model, model analysis, and model predictions
In this section, we modify the zealot/noisy voter model to include reinforcement and echo
chambers. In the underlying basic voter model (without zealots) [30], each individual
adopts an opinion (opinion 1 or opinion 2). At rate µ > 0, a person rethinks his/her opin-
ion, and copies the opinion of a randomly chosen population member. In the situation of a
finite, homogeneously mixing population, this Markov process will end up in an absorbing
state, where only one opinion remains. The other opinion dies out. This outcome is nat-
urally unrealistic, and thus the zealot model [4] assumes an additional mechanism. Apart
of floating voters, i.e. individuals who change their opinion, there are zealots. Zealots are
individuals with a strong opinion and thus do not change their mind, even when in contact
with a distinct opinion whether from other individuals, newspapers or other mass media.
Moreover, zealots influence the opinion of floating voters, as a floating persons copies the
opinion of a randomly selected individual out of the group of all individuals (floating vot-
ers or zealots). In the zealot model, all opinions persist at all time as the model has no
absorbing state and a non-trivial invariant distribution [4].
We model reinforcement and echo chambers as follows. An individual who “live” in an
echo chamber does not interact with a representative sample of the population, but only
with a sub-group of individuals who are more likely to share the same opinion. We intro-
duce weights ϑi ∈ (0, 1] to express the reduced interaction with the opponent group. We
want to compute the share of votes for each party as a function of the model parameters
(especially the reinforcement).
Let N denote the total population size, Ni the number of zealots with opinion i ∈ {1, 2},
and ϑi ∈ (0, 1] the weights for the opposite opinion. If Xt is the number of supporters for
opinion 1, while N −Xt is that for opinion 2, then
Xt → Xt + 1 at rate
µ(N −Xt)ϑ1(Xt +N1)
ϑ1(Xt +N1) + (N −Xt +N2)
, (1)
Xt → Xt − 1 at rate
µXt ϑ2(N −Xt +N2)
(Xt +N1) + ϑ2(N −Xt +N2)
. (2)
Note that ϑ1 is the probability of group-2-individuals to interact with group 1, and
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ϑ2 that of group-1-members to interact with group 2. To be clear, ϑ2 measures thus the
strength of reinforcement of group 1. Obviously, this model agrees with the zealot model
in case of ϑ1 = ϑ2 = 1.
In order to understand the properties of the model, we investigate the vote share in the
continuum limit N → ∞. As it is well known from parallel investigations in population
genetics [48], two different scales of the parameters are sensible: 1) the number of zealots
scale linearly with N , s.t. Ni = niN , while the reinforcement parameters ϑi are constant
in N (the deterministic limit) or 2) Ni are constant in N and ϑi = 1 + O(N
−1), called
the weak effects limit in which the effect of zealots and reinforcement become small if the
population size becomes large.
We start with the deterministic limit. If the intrinsic and extrinsic influences are strong,
often the state can be well approximated by a normal distribution with a variance that
declines with the inverse of the population size. In the limit, we obtain an ordinary differ-
ential equation (ODE) for the fraction of opinion-1-supporters, (ni are the ratio of zealots
over free voters, Ni/N , for a derivation see the supplementary information, SI)
x˙ = −µx
ϑ2(1− x+ n2)
(x+ n1) + ϑ2(1− x+ n2)
(3)
+µ(1− x)
ϑ1(x+ n1)
ϑ1(x+ n1) + (1− x+ n2)
.
It is possible to analyze bifurcations, that is change-points in the structure of stationary
solutions (see Fig. 1 (a) and SI).
Particularly, in the symmetric case (all group-specific parameters Ni, ϑi are identical),
we find a Pitchfork bifurcation if the reinforcement becomes large. If ϑi (the probability to
interact with the opposite group) drops below a certain threshold, suddenly two stationary
states appear, both of them being locally asymptotically stable. One of the two opinions
does prevail, and the other opinion (which has the potential to also prevail) cannot in-
fluence the population strongly enough to change this state. In non-symmetric cases, the
group that follows a strong reinforcement strategy also has a strong advantage versus the
opponent’s group. Even if the opponent group has way more zealots, the opinion with the
reinforcement strategy does prevail (see SI).
On the one hand, the deterministic limit allows to easily analyze and visualize the long
term behavior. On the other hand, population genetics studies [48] show that the weak
effect models are more realistic when it comes to the analysis of data. In this case, the
zealots are constant in number, and the reinforcement declines with the inverse of the free
voters’ number, ϑi = 1− θi/N . Under these assumptions we obtain an explicit formula for
the invariant distribution of group 1’s vote share x for N →∞, (SI)
ϕ(x) = C e
1
2
(θ1+θ2)x2−θ1 x xN1−1 (1− x)N2−1. (4)
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Figure 1: Behavior of the zealot model with reinforcement. (a): Stationary states (solid
lines: locally asymptotically stable, dashed line: unstable) and pitchfork bifurcation (in-
dicated by a bullet) of the deterministic limit. Panels (b)-(d): Corresponding invariant
measures of the weak-effects limit. Parameters (a): n1 = n2 = 0.1, ϑ1 = ϑ2 = ϑ; (b)-(d):
N1 = N2 = 20, and (b) θ1 = θ2 = 10, (c) θ1 = θ2 = 70, (d) θ1 = θ2 = 80, (e) θ1 = θ2 = 100.
The second term, xN1−1 (1−x)N2−1, only depends on the zealot’s numbers. This term is a
beta distribution, as predicted by the zealot model. The Beta-distribution is modified by
the first factor e
1
2
(θ1+θ2)x2−θ1 x that reflects the effect of reinforcement. The multiplicative
constant C ensures that the integral of the distribution is 1.
As indicated in Fig. 1 (b)-(d), the bifurcations in the deterministic limit can be found back
in the invariant measure of the weak-effects limit. If the scaled reinforcement parameters
θi become large, the unimodal distribution becomes bimodal, which corresponds to the
pitchfork bifurcation observed above. In terms of statistical physics [28], the positive
feedback introduced by the reinforcement mechanism is able to drive the system into a
phase transition.
3 Data analysis
We compare in the following the theoretical predictions with empirical findings. Hereby, we
assume that each election district is independent of all other districts, and identical real-
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ization of the invariant distribution of the democratic process. For each election, we obtain
the results of voting for many election districts and use a maximum-likelihood method
to estimate the model parameters (reinforcement parameter for each candidate/party).
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS) is applied to assess the consistency of the theoretical
model to empirical data, namely by obtaining the p-value that the distribution of vote
share for one party against the sum of the other ones does fit our prediction from the
reinforcement or the zealot model. The likelihood-ratio test (LL) to compare the perfor-
mance of these models. We obtain also an estimate of the reinforcement parameter for
each candidate/party.
For the data analysis, we assume that the results in different election districts are in-
dependent replicas of the election. This assumptions is, of course, a simplification. First,
there is a spatial correlation in the election results [3]. Second, election districts are influ-
enced by social covariates or nuisance variables as income or the dichotomy rural/city area.
Third, we developed our theory for dichotomous elections, but apply the results also to
multi-party systems in focusing on one given party, and lumping all other parties together
into one pseudo-group. However, if we pool the districts, it is possible that some if the
perturbing influences become less important. And indeed, the analysis shows that the data
are described quite well.
US presidential elections We find a good agreement of the reinforcement model and
data for the recent US presidential elections 2000-2016 (Fig. SI, Fig. 1). The KS test
yields p-values larger or equal 0.1 apart of the year 2000. This finding indicates that
the reinforcement model cannot be rejected. The year 2000 is kind of exception, as also
the green party did win a considerable percentage of votes. For the 2000 and the 2004-
elections, the zealot and the reinforcement models fit equally well. For the election results
between 2008-2016 the reinforcement model is superior (LL-test), and the zealot model is
not appropriate (KS, see SI for details, point estimates and test results). When inspecting
the reinforcement parameters for the two parties (Fig. 2), we find that the reinforcement
for the democrats is rather unimportant (in comparison to that of the republicans) before
2016. In the 2016 election, the reinforcement of the democrats jumps to the averaged value
of the republicans before 2016, while the reinforcement of the republicans shows a more
than twofold increase (Fig. 2). We associate this effect to the consequences of the populist
attitude of the republican candidate Donald Trump.
Brexit The reinforcement-model is statistically clearly superior to the zealot model to
describe the Brexit data (likelihood-ratio test p < 10−10, see also SI, Fig. 2). Also the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test clearly indicates that the reinforcement-model cannot be rejected
(p = 0.75), but the zealot model that does not incorporate reinforcement is not appropriate
(KS: p = 0.0009). Interestingly, the point estimates for θi, suggests that the brexiters
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Figure 2: Estimates of reinforcement parameters for elections in the USA (a), in Germany
(b). (a) Estimates of the reinforcement parameter for the USA presidential elections in
2000–2016. Note that in 2000-2012, the reinforcement-parameter for the democrats is
negligible small, and only in 2016 it becomes visible. (b) Reinforcement parameter for
several parties, from the parliamentary elections in 2017 for whole Germany.
are responsible for over 99% of the reinforcement. In order to investigate this finding
more thoroughly, we use the likelihood-ratio test to compare a restricted model where
both groups do have the same reinforcement parameters (θ1 = θ2) and the model where
the reinforcement parameter for both groups are arbitrary. It turns out that the model
that allows for more reinforcement in brexetiers than in remainers is highly superior (the
hypothesis that the reinforcement parameters for both groups are identical is rejects at
p <1e-10). The model hints to the fact that populist tendencies have been at the brexetiers
part, and only in a minor amount in the remainders side.
Germany If we investigate the detailed parliamentary (Bundestag) election results from
2017 for the seven parties that are present in the parliament, we find that reinforcement
plays a role particularly for two parties: “AFD” and “Die Linke”. Both parties are known
as populist parties [26, 22, 21] on either side of the political spectrum. For all other parties,
reinforcement is not statistically significant. We further find that the reinforcement of the
8
AFD is strongly connected with the “new” states (the states/regions that are located in the
former DDR/Eastern Germany) and not in the “old” states (states/regions of the former
Western Germany, see SI), while the reinforcement of “Die Linke” seems to be independent
of the geographic location of “old” and “new” states.
France We analyzed the election data for the first and the second round of the presi-
dential elections to detect signatures of reinforcement. When especially studying the 2017
elections, and focusing on the candidate of the Front National, Marine Le Pen, the rein-
forcement model does not fit better than the zealot model (LL: p ≈ 1). These results are
obtained at the scale of department administrative units as well as at the smaller units
of the canton. From our analysis point of view, it appears that Marine Le Pen does not
exhibit the populist reinforcement observed for the republicans in the US, the Brexiters in
the UK and the AFD party in Germany. When studying the first round of the presidential
elections since 1965, we find that in several instances, the reinforcement model fits better
than the zealot model, for example (SI,Table 5) for De Gaulle (1965), Chaband-Delmas
(1974), Chirac (1981, 1988, 1995, 2002), Jospin (2002), Sarkozy (2007, 2012), Hollande
(2012) and Fillon (2017). The parameter of reinforcement often is above 0.5 meaning that
if there is any effect, it reflects the ability of the candidates to retain their supporters in
the long term. It is also possible, that the model – that is only build for two parties - fails
to appropriately interpret the data of the multi-party system in France.
Phase Transition Our model predicts that a phase transition is possible which impacts
the outcome. In effect, some groups may become supercritical, leading to a bimodal dis-
tribution appearing in the election data. We observe such bimodal distributions in The
Netherlands 1967 parliamentary elections (Fig. 3).
The Netherlands have a proportional voting system, where many parties compete for
votes. In order to handle this situation, we focus on one group and merge all other groups in
a pseudo-party. As shown in Fig. 3, the model is able to fit the overall structure of the data.
The Dutch party we address is the ”Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP)”, the Catholic People’s
Party. After the second world war, this party played a major role in The Netherlands with
a vote share of about 0.33; only after 1967, the vote share dropped to around 0.25. During
the active time of the party, especially before 1971, the reinforcement model is highly
superior to the zealot model (LL: p < 10−10). We clearly find a bimodal distribution
(Fig. 3).
4 Discussion
A first major result of our study is that neutral models, that is, models that do not take
political content into account, are able to reveal fundamental structures in the political
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Figure 3: The model result for the 1967 election in The Netherlands where the focal group
is the Catholic People’s Party. We did fit the model using the focal group versus the pooled
remaining groups.
process. At present, such models do not play a major role in the scientific discussion. The
situation resembles that of population genetics and ecology 20 years ago, when neutral
models for the analysis of fundamental evolutionary and ecological mechanisms have been
proposed. Only after a long discussion (that partially is still going on), these tools have
been accepted as a valuable way to access important research questions [6, 25, 23]. We
expect that also in the political sciences, models as those proposed in the present study
gain importance.
The second central finding of the present paper is that the method proposed is able to
detect reinforcement in election data. Interestingly, in these empirical findings, the groups
identified to use reinforcement are im general populist parties or candidates. It is a central
argument in the literature (see introduction) that populist parties fuel and use echo cham-
bers and communication bubbles, a finding which we confirm here using a mathematical
and statistical neutral model. However, it is intriguing that not all populists groups leave
detectable traces in election data. While Trump in the US, the Brexit, or the German
AFD clearly can be identified as candidates/elections/groups where reinforcement played
a role, our model does not show a signal for Le Pen in France. Marie Le Pen is one of
the central persons in contemporary France politics, and classically defined as a far right
wing populist. Our method detects derivations of the vote share distributions from the
beta distribution, predicted by the zealot model. The results of Le Pen does not show that
spatial heterogeneity which is detectable by our method. We offer several non-mutually
exclusive explanations. The central organization of French politics and French adminis-
trations (for exemple relatively to Germany) may promote homogeneity, thus making the
populist signature not observable by our method. The reinforcement for populist parties
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may take place in social groups that are not spatially segregated. In the later case, the
segregation triggered by reinforcement cannot be detected using spatial data. Finally, the
social and political structure in France may generate an overall polarization effect which
decreases the observable signatures of echo chambers in the votes. In other words, po-
larization (reinforcement) for ar against a candidate appear to fairly common for several
candidates per election as suggested by the analysis of several presidential election results.
The third central finding is the prediction of phase transitions in electoral systems by
populist parties and candidates; this prediction is confirmed in data from The Netherlands.
The prototypical model in statistical physics exhibiting phase transitions is the Potts model
respectively the Glauber dynamics [28, 17]. Also in application close to election data (twit-
ter data ahead of elections) indicated that this system is close to a phase transition [39].
As the basis of the Glauber dynamics (so-called low temperature limit) is a majority rule,
while the model presented here is based on interactions of single individuals, we think that
our model is more appropriate for social dynamics.
The social mechanisms that create the phase transitions are clearly visible in the Dutch
Catholic People’s Party in the 1970s. The data show that this party did divide the popula-
tion. The religious segregation at that time corresponded to a certain spatial segregation:
Catholic and Protestant population tended to separate. Spatial or social segregation is for
sure one of the major driver for reinforcement, as this segregation creates a homogeneous
environment that minimizes the contact with different opinions. The spatial model shows
that also the reverse direction is possible: alignment of the opinion with close neighbors
yields locally homogeneous population, such that in consequence different opinions prevail
in different regions, with sharp spatial transitions.
We interpret our findings in the context of perceptual psychology. The main point of
the present study is the question how individuals form their opinion. In that, the various
aspects of the information bias plays a role. A focal individual forms his/her opinion based
on new, external information, and based upon his/her pre-knowledge resp. prejudices. A
main aspect of external information is “framing”. Particularly complex information are
often simplified and presented in a (group-specific) representation/interpretation [5]. In
our model, the effect of framing can be identified with the effect of zealots. A person,
however, filters incoming information based on his/her experiences, including his/her social
(network) contacts. As a result, we find the “confirmation bias”. Individuals seem to rather
select external information that agrees with his/her own opinion [38]. The present study
is a hint that the confirmation bias is active, at least on a group level. Our results might
indicate that confirmation bias does not only depend on the information per se, or the
mindset of a focal individual, but that also the context of the social environment influences
the readiness to accept new arguments. While the term “confirmation bias” mainly focus
on an individual and the information at hand, it is likely that information is also rejected as
it does not align with the opinion in the close social environment. This interpretation of the
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confirmation bias/reinforcement resembles the emphasis of “tradition” for the development
of knowledge in the theory of Feyerabend [11].
The effect of confirmation bias/reinforcement, understood in the sense discussed above, is
rather strong. It is even possible that the prevailing opinion cannot be predicted based on
the parameters - we are faced with a bistable setting. What are the practical implications
and consequences of these findings? At the present time, the society is faced with major
tasks as the implication of the climate change [37] of the effect of strong inequalities in
the society [42], to name but a few. Even if there is an almost perfect consensus about a
topic at the rational level, as it is in the case of the climate change, only the society is the
one who can take actions. At that point, e.g. climate-change deniers as well as climate-
scientists will use framing. The topic is too complex to be discussed in each detail, and
not all details may be known. In any case, climate-change deniers tend also to organize in
populist groups and parties (Trump, AFD), which clearly establish structures based on the
confirmation bias/reinforcement. We have seen that the reinforcement mechanism is strong
as individuals that join that group tend to stay within that group. If the climate-change
deniers use reinforcement, while the climes-scientists only argument rationally, the rational
information pressure has to be high to shift the overall opinion in the society towards the
appropriate actions. A recent example, where this mechanisms may have been decisive, is
the Brexit: The brexitiers results show a strong reinforcement component, while the model
detected rather little reinforcement on the remainers’ side. And indeed, the brexitiers have
been successful with this strategy. If the mechanisms addressed here are well understood,
they have the potential to be used and miss-used for a kind of social engineering.
We might speculate about the bases of populism and in particular of reinforcement. We
emphasize that what follows is not a direct consequence of the model and the model-based
data analysis, but rather few speculative interpretations. In Europe populism has gained
importance in recent years [29, 18]. We can speculate that this may be a consequence of
neo-liberalism, which gained importance since 1980s. As neo-liberalism tends to strongly
emphasizes the predominance of individual values versus societal values, this can lead to
weaken the agreement on common values, common ideas, and common communication
codes. In this situation, sub-groups or candidates can challenge the accepted communi-
cation framework, such as the far right-wing populist party AFD in Germany, breaking
away from the well established convention on how to address the Holocaust question in
Germany.
Another explanation is discussed by Van Reybrouck [50]. He suggests that modern democ-
racies tend to become technocracies, and due to the complexity of modern societies and eco-
nomics, experts do influence politics and policies substantially. Moreover, supra-national
organizations (IMF, WTO, UN, EU, ...) and supra-national treaties have become impor-
tant. However, these organizations are rather complex and opaque structures and more
or less democratically legitimized. As such, they are the perfect targets fuelling populist
movements ideas of an international corrupted elite.
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Lastly, there may even be evolutionary mechanisms promoting reinforcement. About 150
000 years ago, modern humans formed small groups or tribes that did compete for food and
resources. According to Tomassello [49], each of these groups established an “objective”
moral, which was group-specific. This “objective” morale established and enforced norms
and standards for the group members that may have guaranteed the (optimal) functioning
of the group. Therefore, the tendency of humans to align with their social environment,
and therewith the origin of reinforcement, may be even seen as the heritage of behavioural
selection in early mankind.
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A Model analysis
We perform a deterministic limit of our model, and a weak.effects limit; the deterministic
limit allows for a bifurcation analysis. Accordingly, in the weak-effects limit, we find phase
transitions. Moreover, the invariant measure of the weak.effects limit is used in the data
analysis.
Recall that the model reads (details about the meaning of parameters are stated in the
main part of the paper)
Xt → Xt + 1 at rate µ(N −Xt)
ϑ1(Xt +N1)
ϑ1(Xt +N1) + (N −Xt +N2)
, (5)
Xt → Xt − 1 at rate µXt
ϑ2(N −Xt +N2)
(Xt +N1) + ϑ2(N −Xt +N2)
. (6)
Only the latter case we obtain a limiting ODE. In order to better understand the
consequences of the mechanism proposed, we first consider the deterministic limit.
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A.1 Deterministic limit
Proposition A.1 Let Ni = niN . Then, the deterministic limit for x(t) = Xt/N reads
x˙ = −µx
ϑ2(1− x+ n2)
(x+ n1) + ϑ2(1− x+ n2)
+ µ(1− x)
ϑ1(x+ n1)
ϑ1(x+ n1) + (1− x+ n2)
. (7)
For n1 = n2 = n and ϑ1 = ϑ2, x = 1/2 always is a stationary point; this stationary point
undergoes a pitchfork bifurcation at ϑ1 = ϑ2 = ϑp, where
ϑp =
1− 2n
1 + 2n
. (8)
Proof: The rates to increase/decrease the state can be written as f+(Xt/N) resp.
f−(Xt/N), where (recall that ni = Ni/N)
f+(x) = µ(1− x)
ϑ1(x+ n1)
ϑ1(x+ n1) + (1− x+ n2)
, f−(x) = µx
ϑ2(1− x+ n2)
(x+ n1) + ϑ2(1− x+ n2)
.
Therewith, the Fokker-Planck equation for the large population size (Kramers-Moyal ex-
pansion) reads
∂tu(x, t) = −∂x((f+(x)− f−(x))u(x, t)) +
1
2N
∂2x((f+(x) + f−(x))u(x, t))
and the ODE due to the drift term in case of N →∞ is given by
d
dt
x = f+(x)− f−(x).
This result establishes eqn. (7). For the following, let ϑ1 = ϑ2 = ϑ. If we also choose
n1 = n2 = n, we have a neutral model, and x = 1/2 is a stationary point for all ϑ ≥ 0,
n > 0. We find the Taylor expansion of the r.h.s. at x = 1/2 (using the computer algebra
package maxima [31])
µ−1
d
dt
x = −x
ϑ(1− x+ n2)
(x+ n1) + ϑ(1− x+ n2)
+ (1− x)
ϑ(x+ n1)
ϑ(x+ n1) + (1− x+ n2)
= −2ϑ
(2n + 1)ϑ + (2n − 1)
(2n + 1) (ϑ + 1)2
(
x−
1
2
)
+
32ϑ (ϑ + n− ϑ2(n+ 1))
(2n + 1)3 (ϑ + 1)4
(
x−
1
2
)3
+O((x− 1/2)4)
For ϑ ∈ (0, 1), n > 0, the coefficient in front of the third order term always is non-zero,
while the coefficient in front of the linear term becomes zero at ϑ = ϑp. Hence, we have a
pitchfork bifurcation at that parameter.

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Figure 4: Stationary points of the reinforcement model over ϑ. The pitchfork bifurcation
in (a) is indicated by a bullet, the saddle-node bifurcations in (b) and (c) are indicated by
open circles. Stable branches of stationary points are represented by solid lines, unstable
branches by dotted lines. (a) n1 = n2 = 0.1, ϑ1 = ϑ2 = ϑ, (b) n1 = 0.1, n2 = 0.105,
ϑ1 = ϑ2 = ϑ, (c) n1 = n2 = 0.1, ϑ2 = 0.5, (d) n1 = 0.2, n2 = 0.02, ϑ1 = 1.0.
The pitchfork bifurcation is unstable against any perturbation that breaks the symme-
try x 7→ 1 − x (Fig. 4). In panel (a), we have the symmetric case, and find the proper
pitchfork bifurcation. Panel (b) shows the result if the number of zealots only differs
slightly, where the reinforcement-parameter for both groups are assumed to be identical.
We still find a reminiscent of the pitchfork bifurcation: The stable branches in (b) are close
to the stable branches in (a), and also the unstable branches correspond to each other.
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For the limit n2 → n1, panel (b) converges to panel (a). However, the branches are not
connected any more but dissolve in two unconnected parts, and the pitchfork bifurcation
is replaced by a saddle-node bifurcation.
In panel (c) and (d), the upper branch visible in panel (b) did vanish, and only the lower
branch is present. As ϑ2 is kept constant (ϑ2 = 0.5 in panel (c) and ϑ2 = 0 in panel (d))
and only ϑ1 does vary, there is no continuous transition to panel (a).
The effect of reinforcement for a given group resembles an increase in the number of
the group’s zealot. Reinforcement may lead to the dominance of a group. In panel (d),
the second group has only 1/10 of the zealots of the first group, but is able to take over
if the members of that group do an extreme reinforcement (ϑ1 ≪ 1). However, if the
reinforcement of both groups is has a similar intensity and is strong, the mechanism is
symmetrical, with a bistable setting as the consequence (panel (a)).
A.2 Weak effects limit
We now turn to the second scaling – the effect of zealots, and also the effect of the echo
chambers, are taken to be weak. Under these circumstances, it is possible to find a limiting
distribution for the invariant measure of the process.
Theorem A.2 Let Ni denote the number of zealots for group i, N the population size, and
ϑi = 1− θi/N the parameter describing reinforcement. In the limit N →∞, the density of
the invariant measure for the random variable zt = Xt/N is given by
ϕ(x) = C e
1
2
(θ1+θ2)x2−θ1 x xN1−1 (1− x)N2−1, (9)
where C is determined by the condition
∫ 1
0 ϕ(x) dx = 1.
Proof: We again start off with the Fokker-Planck equation, obtained by the Kramers-
Moyal expansion, where we use the scaling ni = Ni/N , and ϑi constant in N . Only
afterwards, we proceed to the desired scaling.
As seen above, the rates to increase/decrease the state can be written as f+(Xt/N) resp.
f−(Xt/N), where (recall that ni = Ni/N)
f+(x) = µ(1− x)
ϑ1(x+ n1)
ϑ1(x+ n1) + (1− x+ n2)
, f−(x) = µx
ϑ2(1− x+ n2)
(x+ n1) + ϑ2(1− x+ n2)
.
Therewith, the limiting Fokker-Planck equation reads
∂tu(x, t) = −∂x((f+(x)− f−(x))u(x, t)) +
1
2N
∂2x((f+(x) + f−(x))u(x, t))
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Figure 5: Invariant distribution, given in eqn. (9) for N1 = N2 = 20. We have θ1 = θ2,
where (a) θ1 = θ2 = 10, (b) θ1 = θ2 = 70, (c) θ1 = θ2 = 80, (d) θ1 = θ2 = 100.
Now we rewrite drift and noise term with the new scaling ni = Ni/N , ϑi = 1−θi/N , where
we neglect terms of order O(N−2). We find (using maxima [31]) that (h := 1/N)
f+(x)− f−(x)
= µ(1− x)
(1− h θ1)(x+ hN1)
(1− h θ1)(x+ hN1) + (1− x+ hN2)
− µx
(1− h θ2)(1− x+ hN2)
(x+ hN1) + (1− h θ2)(1 − x+ hN2)
= µ
(
[(θ1 + θ2)x− θ1]x (1− x)− (N1 +N2)x+N1
)
h+O(h2),
while h(f+(x) + f−(x)) = h 2µx(1− x) +O(h
2). If we rescale time, T = µh t, the Fokker-
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Figure 6: Invariant distribution, given in eqn. (9) for N1 = 22, N2 = 20. We have θ1 = θ2,
where (a) θ1 = θ2 = 10, (b) θ1 = θ2 = 100, (c) θ1 = θ2 = 120, (d) θ1 = θ2 = 140.
Planck equation becomes
∂Tu(x, T ) = − ∂x
{ (
[(θ1+θ2)x−θ1]x (1−x)−(N1+N2)x+N1
)
u(x, T )
}
+∂2x
{
x (1−x)u(x, T )
}
.
For the invariant distribution ϕ(x), the flux of that rescaled Fokker-Planck equation is
zero, that is,
−
(
[(θ1 + θ2)x− θ1]x (1− x)− (N1 +N2)x+N1
)
ϕ(x) +
d
dx
(
x(1− x)ϕ(x)
)
= 0.
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With v(x) = x(1− x)ϕ(x), we have
v′(x) =
(
[(θ1 + θ2)x− θ1] +
N1
x
−
N2
1− x
)
v(x)
and hence
v(x) = C e
1
2
(θ1+θ2)x2−θ1 x xN1 (1− x)N2
resp.
ϕ(x) = C e
1
2
(θ1+θ2)x2−θ1 x xN1−1 (1− x)N2−1

For θ1 = θ2 = 0, we obtain the beta distribution, as we fall back to the zealot model
without reinforcement. In the given scaling, the reinforcement is expressed by the expo-
nential multiplicative factor. As ϑi = 1−h θi, and h = 1/N is small, one could be tempted
to assume that we are in the subcritical parameter range of the reinforcement model only,
s.t. the distribution does not show a phase transition. As we see next, this idea is wrong.
Let us first consider the symmetric case, N1 = N2 = N , and θ1 = θ2 = θ (see Fig. 5).
In that case, the distribution is given by
ϕ(x) = C e−θ x (1−x) xN−1 (1− x)N−1.
The function always is symmetric w.r.t. x = 1/2. If θ is small, and N > 0, we find
an unimodal function, with a maximum at 1/2. If, however, θˆ is increased, eventually
a bimodal distribution appears – we find back the pitchfork bifurcation that we already
known from the deterministic limit of the model (Fig. 4, panel a).
As soon as N1 6= N2, the symmetry is broken (Fig. 6), and we have an a situation
resembling Fig. 4, panel (b). In the stochastic setting, however, we have more information:
the second branch concentrates only little probability mass, and will play in practice only
a minor role (if any at all). Only if N1 and N2 are in a similar range, or the dissimi-
larity is balanced by appropriate reinforcement parameters, this second branch is able to
concentrate sufficient probability mass to gain visibility in empirical data.
Comparison of the reinforcement model and the zealot model. We can use the
zealot model or we can use the reinforcement model to fit and interpret election data. The
zealot model for two parties yields the beta distribution. The density of the reinforcement
model basically consist of a product, where one term is identical with the beta distribution,
xN1−1 (1− x)N2−1
while the second term expresses the influence of reinforcement
e
1
2
(θ1+θ2)x2−θ1 x.
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Only if the data have a shape that is different from that of a beta distribution, the rein-
forcement component leads to a significantly improved fit. This is given, e.g., in case of a
bimodal shape of the data (where at least one maximum is in the interior of the interval
(0, 1)), or if the data have heavy tails. Both properties hint to the fact that the election
districts are of two different types: one, where the party under consideration is relatively
strong, and one where it is relatively weak. This difference, in turn, can be interpreted as
the effect of reinforcement: In some election districts voters agree that the given party is
preferable, in others they agree that the party is to avoid. The population is not (spatially)
homogeneous, but some segregation - most likely caused by social mechanisms - take place.
In that, the data analysis of spatially structured election data (results structured by elec-
tion districts) based on the reinforcement model is able to detect spatial segregation and
the consequences thereof.
B Data analysis
B.1 Methods
Parameter estimation: We aim at a maximum-likelihood estimation of the parameters of
the distribution
ϕ(x) = C e
1
2
(θ1+θ2)x2−θ1 x xN1−1 (1− x)N2−1,
where C is determined by
∫ 1
0 ϕ(x) dx = 1. The maximum likelihood parameter estimation
is somewhat subtle as the distribution incorporates exponential terms - in particular, if
the parameters become large, the integral
∫ 1
0 e
1
2
(θ1+θ2)x2−θ1 x xN1−1 (1−x)N2−1 dx becomes
numerically unstable. Therefore, we re-parameterize the distribution, defining νˆ, sˆ, θˆ, and
ψˆ by
θ1 = sˆ θˆ ψˆ, θ2 = sˆ θˆ (1− ψˆ), N1 + 1 = sˆ (1− θˆ) νˆ, N2 + 1 = sˆ (1− θˆ) (1− νˆ), (10)
where θˆ, ψˆ, νˆ ∈ [0, 1], and sˆ > 0, with the restriction sˆ (1− θˆ) νˆ > 1, and sˆ (1− θˆ) (1− νˆ) > 1.
Therewith, the distribution becomes
ϕ(x) = Cˆ exp
[
sˆ
(
θˆ(x2/2 − ψˆ x) + (1− θˆ) νˆ ln(x) + (1− θˆ) (1 − νˆ) ln(1− x) +A
) ]
.
Here, A is a constant that can be chosen in dependency on the data at hand. In practice,
it is used to avoid an exponent that has a very large absolute number. The constant Cˆ is,
as before, determined by the fact that the integral is one. This form allows for a reasonable
maximum likelihood estimation, given appropriate election data.
Numerical issues: The model assumes continuous data, while the election data are
discrete. Therefore, a vote share of 0 or 1 is possible in the empirical data, but the
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distribution may have poles for those values. We replace all empirical vote shares below
10−5 by 10−5, and similarly, all data above 1−10−5 by 1−10−5. In order to determine the
normalization constant of ϕ(x), we do not integrate from 0 to 1, but only from 0.001 to
0.999. Furthermore, for numerical reasons, we restrict sˆ by an upper limit, that we mostly
define as 1800.
Test for reinforcement: The zealot model and the reinforcement model are nested. In
that, we can use the likelihood-ratio test to check for the significance of the reinforcement
component: If LL0 is the log-likelihood for the restricted model (θ1 = θ2 = 0, resp. θˆ = 0),
and LL is that for the full reinforcement model, we have asymptotically, for a large sample
size
2(LL − LL0) ∼ χ
2
2
That is, twice the difference in the log-likelihoods is asymptotically χ2 distributed, where
the degree of freedom is the number of the surplus parameters (here: θ1 and θ2, resp. θˆ
and ψˆ, that is, the degree of freedom is 2).
Additionally, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to find out if the model-distribution
of either the full reinforcement mode, or the zealot model (θ1 = θ2 = 0, resp. θˆ = 0)
agrees with the empirical distribution. If both models are in line with the data, then the
reinforcement component will rather not add to the interpretation of the data, if only the
reinforcement model approximates the data well (or, at least, much better than the zealot
model), we can expect that it is sensible to take the reinforcement component into account.
B.2 Details – US
In the US, the candidates for the presidential elections are determined by the “primary
elections”. We do not consider them, but only the presidential elections themselves. The
election of the president happens indirectly via an Electoral Collage. Each state nominates
a certain number of delegates. In most states, a winner-take-all system is established. If
no candidate receives the majority of the votes, he Congress will elect a candidate.
The data set used is provided by the Havard Univ., and contains the data on county-
level for the elections 2000-2016,
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VOQCHQ, file countypres 2000-2016.csv.
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year party νˆ θˆ ψˆ sˆ θ2 pll pks (Reinf) pks (beta)
2000 green 0.035 0.920 0.33 196.5 120.9 <1e-10 0.043 0.0011
2000 republicans 0.515 0.323 6.61e-05 21.6 6.97 0.86 0.02 0.02
2000 democrats 0.385 0.0272 0.99993 14.0 2.51e-05 1 0.007 0.007
2004 republicans 0.485 0.4971 6.61e-05 26.6 13.2 0.003 0.20 0.17
2004 democrats 0.474 0.435 0.99993 22.9 0.00066 0.03 0.10 0.14
2008 republicans 0.399 0.588 6.61e-05 29.6 17.5 9.65e-07 0.26 0.09
2008 democrats 0.579 0.581 0.99996 27.4 0.00066 7.4e-07 0.17 0.08
2012 republicans 0.404 0.624 6.61e-05 25.3 15.8 1.5e-10 0.43 0.009
2012 democrats 0.561 0.610 0.99993 23.0 0.0009 1.6e-09 0.39 0.012
2016 republicans 0.327 0.793 0.207 60.0 37.7 <1e-10 0.88 <1e-10
2016 democrats 0.529 0.801 0.660 55.0 14.9 <1e-10 0.36 <1e-10
Table 1: Estimated parameters for the two parties in the eight elections. pll is the result of
the likelihood ratio test for the significance of the reinforcement component; pks is the result
of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test for the question of the empirical cumulative distribution
differs significantly from the cumulative distribution of the model (either the reinforcement
model, or zealot model with the beta distribution).
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Figure 7: Distribution of the vote share of republicans/democrats in 2000-2016 presidential
elections. For 2000, we also show the result for the green candidate (note the difference in
the scaling of the x-axis here).
26
B.3 Details – Brexit
In the Brexit referendum (23 June 2016), each voter had the choice “remain” or “leave”.
The election was equal, each vote was counted directly. With 51.89% (and 72.2% turnout
rate), the outcome has been “leave”.
The data follow well the reinforcement model (KS, p = 0.75), but the zealot model
does not fit nicely (KS, p = 0.0009). The likelihood-ratio-test on the null hypothesis that
remainders and brexitiers have the same amount of reinforcement is rejected at p <1e-10.
The data set used is provided by the British Government, and contains data on election
district level,
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/results-and-turnout-eu-referendum,
file EU-referendum-result-data.csv.
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Figure 8: Distribution of the share of votes for remain in the UK Brexit election with fit
of the reinforcement model (solid line) and the zealot model (dashed line).
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νˆ θˆ ψˆ sˆ θ1 θ2 pll pks (Reinf.) pks (beta)
0.87 0.76 0.99996 254.5 193.0 0.0084 <1e-10 0.75 0.0009
Table 2: Parameter for the Brexit referendum, “remainers”. For symmetry reasons, the
parameters for “leave” are identical, but ψˆleave = 1− ψˆremain, and therewith θ2,leave = θ1 =
193.
B.4 Details – Germany
Each voter has two votes in the elections for the German parliament: a “first” and a
“second” vote. With the first vote, a candidate in the election district can be selected.
The candidate with the most votes will be send into the parliament. With the second
vote, a party is selected. The vote share of the parties determines the number of seats in
the parliament, where a party has to overcome a 5% threshold. IN the analysis, only the
second votes are used.
The data are provided by the German Government,
https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundeswahlleiter.html, file btw17 kerg.csv.
party νˆ θˆ ψˆ sˆ θ2 pll pks (Reinf.) pks (beta)
CDU 0.35 0.34 0.67 108.5 12.4 1 0.72 0.79
SPD 0.18 0.30 6.61e-05 63.5 19.0 0.99 0.19 0.20
AFD 0.07 0.77 6.61e-05 792.5 609.0 8.7e-11 0.29 0.0009
FDP 0.14 0.31 1.00 147.5 0.003 1 0.55 0.55
die linke 0.05 0.78 6.61e-05 583.5 453.7 3.4e-09 2.11e-06 2.93e-08
Gruenen 0.07 0.26 6.61e-05 69 18.2 1 0.87 0.84
CSU. 0.37 6.75e-05 6.61e-05 35.6 0.002 1 0.004 0.004
Table 3: Results for whole Germany, 2017.
28
party νˆ θˆ ψˆ sˆ θ2 pll pks (Reinf.) pks (beta)
CDU 0.43 0.74 0.50 575.5 212.5 0.31 0.41 0.78
SPD 0.21 0.09 6.61e-05 53.5 4.87 1 0.17 0.17
AFD 0.13 0.29 1.00 153.5 0.003 1 0.92 0.92
FDP 0.13 0.19 0.88 198.5 4.59 0.91 0.68 0.68
die linke 0.09 0.83 0.14 1138.5 814.5 0.001 0.0007 0.0002
Gruenen 0.13 0.81 0.23 378.5 237.6 0.15 0.12 0.075
CSU 0.37 6.75e-05 6.61e-05 35.6 0.002 1 0.004 0.004
Table 4: Results for Germany, only the “old” states ,2017.
B.5 Details – France/Le Pen
The presidential elections in France have (in principle/mostly) two rounds, a first round
and runoff elections, in case that no candidate receives more than 50% of votes in the first
round. The elections are direct, each vote counts the same.
The data are provided by the France Government. We used data on the level of de´partements.
https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/posts/les-donnees-des-elections/.
29
year candid. νˆ θˆ ψˆ sˆ θ2 pll pks (Reinf.) pks (beta)
1965 MITTERRAND (CIR) 0.29621 0.00006 0.00007 16.70000 0.00092 1.00000 0.00264 0.00264
1965 LECANUET (MRP) 0.14076 0.20379 0.00007 64.50000 13.14346 1.00000 0.90755 0.91032
1965 DE GAULLE (UNR) 0.66489 0.78879 0.69318 873.50000 211.39934 0.00000 0.12579 0.00091
1965 TIXIER-VIGNANCOUR (EXD) 0.03379 0.79450 0.00007 700.50000 556.51034 0.00000 0.00258 0.00004
1969 DUCLOS (PCF) 0.17985 0.00005 0.00007 18.10000 0.00090 1.00000 0.10169 0.10171
1969 DEFFERRE (SFIO) 0.18107 0.91352 0.35652 473.50000 278.33585 0.00000 0.02718 0.00083
1969 POMPIDOU (UDR) 0.87801 0.76567 0.99995 446.50000 0.01612 0.00000 0.25179 0.00015
1969 POHER (CD) 0.22691 0.00008 0.00007 70.00000 0.00550 1.00000 0.12838 0.12844
1974 MITTERRAND (PS) 0.19448 0.69360 0.00007 281.50000 195.23601 0.01984 0.04230 0.00419
1974 GISCARD D’ESTAING (RI) 0.31544 0.05921 0.00007 30.70000 1.81770 1.00000 0.69891 0.69903
1974 CHABAN-DELMAS (UDR) 0.12745 0.80028 0.12755 901.50000 629.42834 0.00000 0.00108 0.00000
1974 ROYER (DVD) 0.02110 0.80942 0.00007 979.50000 792.77773 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
1981 MARCHAIS (PCF) 0.12149 0.54736 0.13981 62.00000 29.19165 0.80061 0.25322 0.33004
1981 MITTERRAND (PS) 0.28329 0.16863 0.99993 140.50000 0.00157 1.00000 0.17275 0.17276
1981 GISCARD D’ESTAING (UDF) 0.32811 0.46247 0.61799 104.50000 18.46186 0.99834 0.14571 0.12528
1981 CHIRAC (RPR) 0.30222 0.83611 0.35581 678.50000 365.44584 0.00000 0.11781 0.00019
1988 MITTERRAND (PS) 0.33390 0.00006 0.00007 84.00000 0.00486 1.00000 0.24234 0.24247
1988 BARRE (UDF) 0.15714 0.00004 0.00007 95.50000 0.00416 1.00000 0.25615 0.25586
1988 CHIRAC (RPR) 0.31120 0.82687 0.36834 532.50000 278.12750 0.00000 0.02471 0.00059
1988 LE PEN (FN) 0.18816 0.76069 0.29438 252.50000 135.53205 0.01609 0.87942 0.23976
30
year candid. νˆ θˆ ψˆ sˆ θ2 pll pks (Reinf.) pks (beta)
1995 JOSPIN (PS) 0.27240 0.25114 0.99993 134.50000 0.00223 1.00000 0.57881 0.56790
1995 BALLADUR (UDF) 0.17659 0.00005 0.00007 85.00000 0.00395 1.00000 0.15455 0.15375
1995 CHIRAC (RPR) 0.29723 0.82776 0.33493 997.50000 549.13604 0.00000 0.06349 0.00000
1995 LE PEN (FN) 0.13366 0.16371 0.00007 57.50000 9.41255 1.00000 0.35950 0.35765
2002 JOSPIN (PS) 0.25701 0.83780 0.31043 890.50000 514.45847 0.00000 0.59056 0.00649
2002 BAYROU (UDF) 0.05982 0.00006 0.00007 114.50000 0.00740 0.99922 0.00000 0.00000
2002 CHIRAC (UMP) 0.27697 0.82723 0.31351 1069.50000 607.35573 0.00000 0.03866 0.00000
2002 LE PEN (FN) 0.14604 0.00004 0.00007 35.30000 0.00149 1.00000 0.06609 0.06608
2007 ROYAL (PS) 0.33165 0.77302 0.38618 419.50000 199.05094 0.00014 0.13556 0.03850
2007 BAYROU (UDF) 0.17800 0.00005 0.00007 108.50000 0.00504 1.00000 0.06028 0.06028
2007 SARKOZY (UMP) 0.48899 0.81562 0.50867 1135.50000 455.03893 0.00000 0.41382 0.00342
2007 LE PEN (FN) 0.08921 0.00004 0.00007 54.00000 0.00235 1.00000 0.11541 0.11533
2012 Jean-Luc MELENCHON (FG) 0.10230 0.00004 0.00007 93.00000 0.00380 1.00000 0.00051 0.00050
2012 Franois HOLLANDE (PS) 0.41777 0.80629 0.45421 599.50000 263.81758 0.00000 0.28500 0.00830
2012 Nicolas SARKOZY (UMP) 0.40273 0.81085 0.44187 610.50000 276.28720 0.00000 0.29963 0.00091
2012 Marine LE PEN (FN) 0.15076 0.00005 0.00007 28.60000 0.00138 1.00000 0.01465 0.01466
2017 LE PEN 0.19953 0.00006 0.00007 23.40000 0.00140 1.00000 0.05362 0.05371
2017 MLENCHON 0.23086 0.47868 0.53214 104.50000 23.40335 1.00000 0.02407 0.01695
2017 MACRON 0.28845 0.39413 0.80474 112.50000 8.65774 0.31516 0.10480 0.03947
2017 FILLON 0.29702 0.82423 0.35947 457.50000 241.53438 0.00000 0.07550 0.00000
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The estimates for Le Pen from 2017 indicate that the model finds no reinforcement
aspects in the data of Le Pen (θˆ ≈ 0). Accordingly, the LL-test indicates that the zealot
model performs as well as the reinforcement-model. The KS-test indicates that the data
(canton level) do not follow the distribution predicted by the reinforcement model, while
the data on district level are close to th reinforcement model (cannot rejected at the
significance level of 0.01, but only at a significance level of 0.05). Note that the number of
data on canton level (n = 35703) is much larger than that on departments level (n = 2090),
which explains that even small deviations from the model distribution leads to extremely
significant values in the KS-test.
election(2017) νˆ θˆ ψˆ sˆ θ2 pll pks (Reinf.) pks (beta)
first round/canton 0.23063 0.00005 0.00007 15.90000 0.00074 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000
first round/departement 0.19953 0.00006 0.00007 23.40000 0.00140 1.00000 0.05362 0.05371
second round/canton 0.39724 0.05783 0.00007 12.40000 0.71699 1.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Table 6: Estimates for Le Pen in the presidential elections (2017), different data sets: First
round and second round (canton level), first round (departement level).
B.6 Details – The Netherlands/ Catholic People’s Party
The parliament’s election in The Netherlands do not have a threshold, but are purely
proportional. That’s interesting as the effect of strategic voting will be less prominent as
e.g. in Germany, where a 5% threshold is implemented. The election districts, however,
have a very different size as only the total number of votes, all over the country, counts.
That might disturb our assumption that all election districts are i.i.d.
The Catholic People’s party did play a central role after the second world war. After 1971,
it did lose importance, and eventually merged with other parties.
The model indicates that the success of the party is almost exclusively due to reinforcement
(νˆ ≈ 0), which explains the peak of the distribution at a vote share of zero (Fig. 2 in the
main paper).
The data can be found at the internet-pages of the Dutch government,
https://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/verkiezingen
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year party νˆ θˆ ψˆ sˆ θ2 pll pks (Reinf.) pks (beta)
1946 (KVP) 6.61e-05 0.98 0.46 29.9 15.9 <1e-10 <1e-10 0
1948 (KVP) 6.61e-05 0.98 0.44 31.0 16.8 <1e-10 <1e-10 0
1952 (KVP) 6.61e-05 0.98 0.39 34.0 19.7 <1e-10 <1e-10 0
1956 (KVP) 6.61e-05 0.98 0.44 30.2 16.5 <1e-10 <1e-10 0
1959 (KVP) 6.61e-05 0.96 0.39 35.4 20.7 <1e-10 <1e-10 0
1963 (KVP) 6.61e-05 0.93 0.32 40.9 26.1 <1e-10 3.21e-06 0
1967 (KVP) 6.61e-05 0.86 0.10 71 54.5 <1e-10 5.1e-05 0
1971 (KVP) 6.61e-05 0.82 6.61e-05 95 77.5 <1e-10 0.0003 0
1972 (KVP) 6.61e-05 0.80 6.61e-05 65 52.1 <1e-10 1.26e-05 0
Table 7: Results for NL/KVP. We find a transition from bimodal to unimodal during the
years.
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